Intentionality is the philosophical concept that mental states are about something — that thinking, believing, desiring, and fearing all point toward objects, states of affairs, or possibilities beyond themselves. Humans constructed this concept to solve the problem of how the mind reaches outward into the world. It persists through the language of mental description ('she thought about X,' 'he fears Y'), through philosophical discourse that maps the space of mental aboutness, and through the disciplines (phenomenology, cognitive science, linguistics) that operationalize it as a research category. Intentionality is not the mental state itself; it is the conceptual lens that identifies directedness as a defining feature of consciousness. [formal: intendibilitas | substrate: mind | horizon: a life | explicit: yes | epoch: 0.10]
Accepted ontology entry
intentionality
Intentionality is the philosophical concept that mental states are about something — that thinking, believing, desiring, and fearing all point toward objects, states of affairs, or possibilities beyond themselves. Humans constructed this c…
Definition
Why it is in scope
The concept of intentionality — the capacity of mental states to be about, represent, or be directed at objects, states of affairs, or other mental states. A human-made philosophical construct arising from the study of consciousness, language, and meaning. The map, not the feeling it describes.
Names and aliases
- intentionalityen · CANONICAL
Relations from this entry
- cmrndsaht0282d1nll9cckx9qINSTANCE_OF →
Intentionality is a specific kind of concept — the philosophical/psychological concept of mental states being directed at objects (aboutness). A competent speaker would say 'intentionality is a concept.' Pinned sense: intentionality as the theoretical construct in philosophy of mind, not the natural phenomenon of directedness itself (Law 2a). Files against the nearest existing kind: concept.
Relations to this entry
- cmrrk157001t2q89dbs0l6jdk← DEPENDS_ON
Volition (the capacity to will/choose) depends on intentionality (aboutness, the directedness of mental states) because willing is always willing-something: remove intentionality and volition loses its object-directed structure and ceases to function as a concept. This is a present-tense constitutive dependency, not historical.
Record identity
- Created
- Jul 19, 2026, 12:58 PM UTC
- Content hash
- 0e1892a7e6f48411c246ef18a384340ddda48f506eec6b29149f836f5260e506